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THE TOLERATION OF UNJUSTIFIED DISTINCTIONS
BETWEEN THE MENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY DISABLED IN
LEWIS v KMART CORP. MAKES ONE THING CLEAR:
NOT ALL DISABILITIES WERE CREATED EQUAL
I. INTRODUCTION
Discrimination against the disabled is not a new problem.1 Histori-
cally, these people have been considered less than human.2 This histori-
cal prejudice has been aimed not only at the physically disabled, but also
the mentally disabled. 3 For example, in medieval England, people would
pay to see mentally disabled individuals publicly displayed. 4 Although
such open mistreatment would be impermissible today, the mentally dis-
abled continue to wage a battle against discrimination.
5
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (1994) (noting that "historically, society has
tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities . . ."); Timothy M.
Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REv.
393, 399-414 (1991) (describing historical and modern practice of segregating dis-
abled from nondisabled); Michael A. Rebell, Structural Discrimination and the Rights
of the Disabled, 74 GEO. LJ. 1435, 1436-37 (1986) (recounting history of discrimina-
tion against disabled individuals); Jonathan C. Drimmer, Comment, Cripples, Over-
comers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for
People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1341, 1359-60 (1993) (providing historical
background of prejudice against disabled individuals). Discrimination against the
disabled in 20th Century America was open, as evidenced by the unabashed views
of the Supreme Court in its opinions. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207
(1927) (concluding that sterilization of feeble-minded woman was constitutional
and pointing out that "[i]t would be strange if [the public welfare] could not call
upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices...
in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence").
2. See Rebell, supra note 1, at 1436-37 (noting that eugenics movement of
early 20th Century viewed handicapped individuals as subhuman creatures).
3. See Wayne Edward Ramage, The Pariah Patient: The Lack of Funding for
Mental Health Care, 45 VAND. L. REv. 951, 951 (1992) ("Anglo-American society
historically has viewed the mentally ill as outsiders.")
4. See RAELJ. ISSAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS: How PSY-
CHIATRY & THE LAW ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL 1 (1990) (stating that people
would pay to have inmates at England's Bedlam hospital for mentally insane dis-
played to public). As a mental institution, Bedlam was "representative of private
medieval institutions to which the insane were committed." Spencer v. Lee, 864
F.2d 1376, 1381 (7th Cir. 1989).
5. See Ramage, supra note 3, at 951 ("Society's disdain of the mentally ill still
exists.... "); see also Philip Boyle, Managed Care in Mental Health: A Cure, Or a Cure
Worse Than the Disease?, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 437, 439-40 (1996) (noting that people
stereotype mentally ill as group that causes its own problems and thus deserving of
lesser benefits); Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can
Sanist Attitudes Be Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15, 26 (1993-94) ("Surveys show that
mental disabilities are the most negatively perceived of all disabilities."). Congress
recognized that the stigma associated with disabilities continues to exist in today's
society. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (2) (stating that discrimination against disabled
(517)
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The United States Congress has seemingly entered this battle by en-
acting legislation designed to thwart discrimination against disabled indi-
viduals. 6 One such piece of legislation is the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 ("ADA") .7 Title I of the ADA specifically addresses discrimina-
tion in the workplace. 8 It prohibits discrimination on the basis of disabil-
ity in "terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."9
Despite this language, employers often provide plans that cap long-
term benefits for mental disabilities earlier than those for physical disabili-
ties.' 0 Although the ADA contains a "safe harbor" provision, which per-
has historically been problem and "such forms of discrimination against individu-
als with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem"). More
specifically, employment discrimination against the mentally disabled is also a his-
torically rooted problem. See Ren~e Ravid, Disclosure of Mental Illness to Employers:
Legal Recourses and Ramifications, 20J. PSYCHOL. & LAw 85, 85 (1992) ("Discrimina-
tion against the mentally ill in the workplace has been the legacy of the hiring,
promotional and termination policies of both private and public employers.").
6. See Adam A. Milani, Living in the World: A New Look at the Disabled in the Law
of Torts, 48 CATH. U. L. REv. 323, 326 (1999) (describing legislation aimed at end-
ing discrimination against disabled individuals). See generally Lowell P. Weicker,Jr.,
Historical Background of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 387
(1991) (outlining history of legislation guaranteeing equal rights for disabled indi-
viduals). One of the first statutes to ensure the disabled protection from discrimi-
nation dates back to the Act of June 10, 1948, which prohibited "employment
discrimination based on physical handicaps within the United States Civil Service."
Id. at 387. Another significant legislative step toward ending discrimination
against the disabled came in 1968 with the passage of the Architectural Barriers
Act. See id. (noting passage of Architectural Barriers Act, which required federal
government to provide access for disabled to buildings it constructed, altered or
financed). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 followed close behind. See id. (noting
Rehabilitation Act required "federal executive agencies to develop, and update an-
nually, affirmative action plans for the hiring, placement, and advancement of in-
dividuals with disabilities"). More recent antidiscrimination legislation includes
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"),42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(1994). See Milani, supra, at 326 (noting that ADA is culmination of much legisla-
tion designed to end discrimination against disabled).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). The stated purpose of the ADA is to pro-
vide "a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities." Id. § 12101(b) (1).
8. See Maggie D. Gold, Must Insurers Treat All Illnesses Equally ?-Mental vs. Phys-
ical Illness: Congressional and Administrative Failure to End Limitations to and Exclusions
from Coverage for Mental Illness in Employer-Provided Health Benefits Under the Mental
Health Parity Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 767, 789
(1997-98) ("Title I of the ADA addresses employment practices, Title II concerns
public services and Title III addresses public accommodations provided by private
entities.").
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). The ADA mandates that: "No covered entity
shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disa-
bility of such individual in regard to .. .terms, conditions, and privileges of em-
ployment." Id.
10. See, e.g., Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 603-04 (3d Cir.
1998) (noting that benefit plan provided physical disability benefits until employee
reached age 65, while mental disability benefits "cease[d] after two years if the
disabled employee was not hospitalized"), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 850 (1999); Parker
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1008 (6th Cir. 1997) (same), cert.
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mits classification of risks, this provision does not give employers
unbridled discretion to distinguish between the mentally and physically
disabled in their benefit plans.1 1 The provision is limited in that it cannot
be used to evade the purposes of Title I and Title III of the ADA.1 2 Thus,
the question is whether one purpose of these titles is to ensure that indi-
viduals with different classes of disabilities are afforded equal disability
benefits.1
3
Most courts have concluded that the ADA does not require equal
levels of benefits for the mentally and physically disabled.1 4 Recently, in
Lewis v. Kmart Corp.,15 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit addressed this issue.' 6 The Fourth Circuit followed the majority of
courts and held that Title I of the ADA does not require employers to
offer equal long-term disability benefits for mental and physical
disabilities.
1 7
This Note considers the Fourth Circuit's holding in Lewis in light of
the plain language of the ADA, its legislative history and relevant court
denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir.
1996) (noting benefit plan that provided long-terms benefits to physically disabled
until age 65, but discontinued long-term benefits to mentally disabled after two
years). Temporal caps are not the only example of unequal treatment of the men-
tally disabled as compared to the physically disabled when insurance is involved;
one can find unequal treatment of the mentally disabled in almost every aspect of
insurance. See Leonard S. Rubenstein, Ending Discrimination Against Mental Health
Treatment in Publicly Financed Health Care, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 315, 315 (1996) (not-
ing that "[c]ompared to physical health care, mental health care has been sub-
jected to stricter limits on utilization, higher co-payments, lower benefit caps and
more restricted types of offered services"). This Note exclusively addresses
whether the ADA requires employers to provide equal levels of long-term disability
benefits to the mentally and physically disabled. It does not discuss the permissibil-
ity under the ADA of affording the mentally disabled lesser health insurance
benefits.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994) (stating that insurers may continue "un-
derwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or
not inconsistent with State law"). The provision allowing for such underwriting,
classifying and administering of risks, however, cannot be used as a "subterfuge to
evade the purposes of subchapter I and III of this chapter." Id.
12. See id. ("Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of subchapter I and III of this chapter.") (footnote omitted).
For a discussion of the ambiguity behind the meaning of the term "subterfuge,"
see infra note 33 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the different views courts have taken as to whether the
ADA requires equality of long-term disability benefits for the mentally and physi-
cally disabled, see infra notes 52-83 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the courts that have held that drawing distinctions
between disabilities is not a form of discrimination the ADA protects against, see
infra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
15. 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999).
16. See id. at 168 (noting that issue before court was whether Title I, § 102(a)
of ADA requires equal long-term disability benefit plans for mentally and physi-
cally disabled).
17. See id. at 172 (concluding that Kmart's long-term disability benefit plan
did not violate Title I of ADA).
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holdings regarding the same or similar issues.1 8 Part II of this Note re-
views the statutory language of the ADA.1 9 Part II also addresses the legis-
lative history of the ADA and legislative developments since the enactment
of the ADA. 2°1 Additionally, Part II discusses the manner in which other
courts have disposed of the same or similar issues. 21 Part III discusses the
relevant facts of Lewis. 22 Part IV analyzes and critiques the Fourth Cir-
cuit's approach in Lewis in determining that Title I of the ADA does not
require long-term disability benefits for the mentally disabled to be
equivalent to those of the physically disabled. 23 Finally, Part V considers
the possible impact of allowing employers to offer different levels of bene-
fits for mental and physical disabilities without providing a factual justifica-
tion for the distinction. 24
II. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Statutory Language of the ADA
Congress enacted the ADA to eliminate discrimination against the dis-
abled. 25 This protection was intended for both the physically and the
18. For a discussion of the ADA's statutory language, the ADA's legislative
history and court holdings relevant to the issue raised in Lewis, see infra notes 25-95
and accompanying text.
19. For an overview of the statutory language of the ADA, see infra notes 25-34
and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the ADA's legislative history and legislative develop-
ments following the enactment of the ADA, see infra notes 35-51 and accompany-
ing text.
21. For a discussion of the approaches used by other courts to resolve the
same or similar issues, see infra notes 54-95 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the facts of Lewis, see infra notes 96-103 and accompa-
nying text.
23. For a discussion and critical analysis of the court's reasoning in Lewis, see
infra notes 104-72 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the possible consequences of permitting employers to
offer withoutjustification benefit plans that distinguish between mental and physi-
cal disabilities, see infra notes 173-83 and accompanying text.
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1) (1994) (providing that purpose of chapter is
"to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities"). Preceding the stated purpose
of the ADA, Congress enumerated its findings regarding discrimination against
the disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (1994) (giving overview of congressional
findings). For example, Congress noted that studies show that the disabled con-
tinue to be disadvantaged in several aspects of life. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (6)
(1994) ("[C]ensus data, national polls, and other studies have documented that
people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are
severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally.").
These studies are especially significant considering the large number of Americans
that have one or more disabilities. See42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (1) (1994) (stating that
approximately 43,000,000 Americans suffer from at least one disability, whether
physical or mental, and that number is increasing).
520 [Vol. 45: p. 517
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mentally disabled. 26 Tide I of the ADA addresses employment discrimina-
tion, stating that employers cannot discriminate against disabled individu-
als regarding "terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."
27
Although Congress did not expound upon the meaning of the phrase
"privileges of employment" in the ADA, it is likely that Congress intended
the phrase to include long-term disability insurance.
28
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) (defining "disability" with respect to indi-
vidual as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impair-
ment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment"); see also CONG. REC.
S10785-10786 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (noting compromise amendment to ex-
clude certain conditions such as homosexuality from definition of disability, but
retaining protection for mental impairments); Mary T. Giliberti, The Application of
the ADA to Distinctions Based on Mental Disability in Employer-Provided Health and Long-
Term Disability Insurance Plans, 18 MENTAL & PHYSIcAL DISABILrTy L. REP. 600, 600
(1994) (noting that mental and physical disabilities are covered equally under
ADA). Although the ADA expressly applies to mental disabilities, there is a lack of
examples in the legislative history of discrimination against the mentally disabled.
See Perlin, supra note 5, at 19 (noting that mental disabilities are scarcely addressed
in legislative history of ADA, early commentaries and practice manuals).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). Specifically, the statutory language states,
"No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Id. Courts
must determine whether a claimant is a qualified individual with a disability to
establish that the claimant has standing to bring the action under Title I of the
ADA. See Charles B. Lynch, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Disability Plans, 22
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 561, 576 (1998) (noting that one prevalent ADA issue is
whether claimant is a qualified individual with a disability and thus has standing to
bring claim under ADA). Courts (and commentators), however, disagree as to the
meaning of the term. Compare Bril v. Dean Witter, 986 F. Supp. 171, 176 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (holding that plaintiff did not have standing to bring claim under ADA be-
cause she was totally disabled and thus not qualified individual with a disability),
and Esfahani v. Medical College of Pa., 919 F. Supp. 832, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(holding that plaintiff's ADA claim only applied to period before plaintiff became
totally disabled), with Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 605-06 (3d Cir.
1998) (noting that because Title I of ADA guarantees right to bring claim when
discrimination occurs regarding fringe benefits, which includes disability benefits,
then "[i]n order for the rights guaranteed by Title I to be fully effectuated, the
definition of 'qualified individual with a disability' would have to permit suits ...
by more than just individuals who are currently able to work with or without rea-
sonable accommodations"), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 850 (1999), and Gonzales v. Gar-
ner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1532 (lth Cir. 1996) (Anderson, J.,
dissenting) ("It would be counter-intuitive ... to suppose . . . that Congress in-
tended to protect current employees' fringe benefits, but intended to then ab-
ruptly terminate that protection upon retirement or termination, at precisely the
time that those benefits are designed to materialize."), and Nancy Lee Firak,
Threshold Barriers to Title I and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Discrimina-
tion Against Mental Illness in Long-Term Disability Benefits, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 205, 263-
66 (1998) (noting reasons that "qualified individual with a disability" language
should not be deemed to prevent those discriminated against in terms of long-
term disability benefits from having standing to bring claim under ADA).
28. See Giliberti, supra note 26, at 600 (noting that. § 12112(a) "mandates
non-discrimination in all employee benefits, which presumably include health, life,
5
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Although the ADA's language seems to suggest that employers may
not use classification of disabilities as mental or physical as a basis for dis-
tinctions in their long-term benefit plans, the issue is not so straightfor-
ward.29 For example, it is uncertain whether the scope of the ADA's
protection extends to discrimination between two categories of disabilities,
or whether it only protects the disabled from discrimination in relation to
the nondisabled,3 0 Even assuming that the ADA protects against discrimi-
nation between disabilities, the precise role of the ADA's safe harbor pro-
vision, which allows insurance companies to classify risks, is likewise
unclear.3 1 The safe harbor provision explicitly allows for the classification
of risks, but it may not be used as a "subterfuge to evade the purposes of
subchapter I and III of this chapter."3 2 What Congress meant to be in-
cluded under the term "subterfuge," however, is not readily apparent from
and long-term disability insurance"); see also Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
121 F.3d 1006, 1015 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that "discrimination in the provision
of fringe benefits during employment is governed strictly by Title I and the provi-
sion of a long-term disability plan is a fringe benefit of employment"), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 871 (1998). Under the ADA, an employer discriminates against an em-
ployee if he or she enters into a contract that is discriminatory within the meaning
of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (1994) (stating that discrimination in-
cludes "participating in a contractual or other arrangement" that would result in
discrimination against employee with disability that is prohibited under ADA).
29. For a discussion of the various views taken by the courts regarding this
issue, see infra notes 54-83 and accompanying text.
30. Compare Parker, 121 F.3d at 1015 (holding that ADA does not prohibit dis-
parate treatment between disabilities), and Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95
F.3d 674, 678 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding that if distinction applies equally to
disabled in relation to nondisabled, then distinction is not disability-based discrim-
ination), with Schroeder v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.93-M-2433,
1994 WL 909636, at *4 (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 1994) (looking to ADA to reach conclu-
sion that if employer decides to make distinction between mental and physical
disabilities in insurance plan, it must justify distinction with actuarial data or rea-
sonably anticipated experience).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994) (allowing for classification of risks pro-
vided such classification is not subterfuge). This provision states:
Subchapters I through III of this chapter and title IV of this Act shall
not be construed to prohibit or restrict-
(1) an insurer.., or entity that administers benefit plans . . . from
underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are
based on or not inconsistent with State law; or
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establish-
ing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide ben-
efit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or
administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State
law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establish-
ing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide ben-
efit plan that is not subject to State laws that regulate insurance.
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of subchapter I and III of this chapter.
Id. (footnote omitted).
32. Id.
[Vol. 45: p. 517
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the statutory language. 33 Because the statutory language does not clarify
the circumstances in which an insurance plan may offer unequal benefits
based on disability, the legislative history can help to determine Congress'
intent.3
4
B. Legislative History of the ADA and Relevant Post-Enactment Legislation
The legislative history of the ADA helps determine its intended role
in the elimination of disability discrimination. 35 In broad terms, the goal
of the ADA is to "permit the United States to take a long-delayed but very
necessary step to welcome individuals with disabilities fully into the main-
33. See Alexander Abbe, Comment, "Meaningful Access" to Health Care and the
Remedies Available to Medicaid Managed Care Recipients Under the ADA and the Rehabili-
tation Act, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1161, 1176-77 (1999) (noting that courts disagree as
to what actions by insurance companies constitute subterfuge for purposes of
ADA). Prior to the ADA's enactment, Congress had used the word "subterfuge" in
the original version of the ADEA. See RUTH COLKER & BONNIE POITRAs TUCKER,
THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 637 (2d ed. 1998) (noting that Congress
used term "subterfuge" when it enacted Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") interpreted
"subterfuge" in this context to include making decisions based on age without jus-
tifying such decisions with evidence of valid cost considerations. See id. at 638
("The EEOC had taken the position in its interpretive regulations that [benefit]
plans [that made distinctions based on age] would have to satisfy an economic test
of cost considerations to pass muster."). The Supreme Court disagreed with the
EEOC's interpretation and instead concluded that for a decision based on age to
be a subterfuge, the claimant had to show there was intent to discriminate. See
Ohio Pub. Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 167 (1989) (noting
that in previous case, Court "held that the term 'subterfuge' must be given its
ordinary meaning as 'a scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion"') (quoting
United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 203 (1977)). Congress, however,
did not agree with the Supreme Court's interpretation. See COLKER & TUCKER,
supra, at 638 (noting that Congress excluded term "subterfuge" when it amended
ADEA in 1990 "to reverse the Betts decision"). Comments made by several House
Representatives provide additional evidence that Congress did not intend the Betts
interpretation of the term "subterfuge" to be applied to the ADA. See 136 CONG.
REc. H4624 (daily ed. May 17, 1990); id. at H4622-H4623 (daily ed. July 12, 1990);
id. at H4626. For example, Representative Waxman stated, "[T]he term 'subter-
fuge' in the ADA should not be read as the Supreme Court read that term in Betts.
Thus, there is no requirement of an intent standard under the ADA . 136
CONG. REC. H4626 (July 12, 1990).
34. See Phillip Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic
Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1137, 1143 (1990) (noting that legisla-
tive intent is often determined by looking at statutory language and legislative his-
tory). But see NAACP v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 294 (7th Cir.
1992) ("We must determine what Congress meant by what it enacted, not what Sena-
tors and Representatives said, thought, wished, or hoped.") (emphasis in original).
35. See Lora E. Keenan, Attorney Fees in Private Party Cost Recovery Actions Under
CERCLA, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 449, 464 (1995) (noting that legislative history is com-
monly used to determine congressional intent); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Stat-
utes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 405, 430 (1989) (noting that although
valid objections can be made to use of legislative history in determining congres-
sional intent, legislative history is valuable when statutory language is ambiguous).
2000] NOTE
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stream of American society." 36 Although Congress passed previous legisla-
tion, such as the Rehabilitation Act,37 to accomplish a similar goal, the
ADA was probably enacted because earlier legislation failed in its
objective. 38
In addition to spelling out the general anti-discrimination goals of the
ADA, the legislative history also addresses specific issues, such as disability-
based distinctions in insurance plans.39 For example, the legislative his-
tory of the ADA suggests that one disability may receive lesser benefits
than another disability, provided the disability receiving lesser benefits
poses increased risks.40 The legislative history also reveals that Congress
did not intend for the classification of risks to be arbitrary, but intended
that the classification be supported either by actuarial evidence, actual ex-
perience or reasonably anticipated experience. 41
Just as legislative history can be used to determine congressional in-
tent, so too can subsequent legislation. 42 Relevant legislation passed after
the enactment of the ADA includes the Mental Health Benefits Parity Act
of 1996 ("Parity Act") .43 The Parity Act requires limited mental health
36. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(I), at 24 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 268.
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-7961 (1994).
38. See Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting congres-
sional displeasure with laws that had been enacted to aid in fight against disability
discrimination). Congress enacted the ADA when it realized that existing laws
were "'inadequate' to combat 'the pervasive problems of discrimination that peo-
ple with disabilities are facing."' Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 101-116, at 18 (1989);
H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 47 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 329); see also
Robert L. Burgdorf, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a
Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 431 (1991)
(noting that "(I]egal commentators have extensively described and lamented the
flaws in the wording, interpretation, and implementation of federal disability non-
discrimination statutes prior to the ADA").
39. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 136 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 419 (noting disabled "cannot be denied insurance or be subject to
different terms or conditions of insurance based on disability alone, if the disability
does not pose increased risks").
40. See id. (proposing disability-based distinction is justified if disability poses
increased risks).
41. See id. at 71 ("ADA requires that underwriting and classification of risks be
based on sound actuarial principles or be related to actual or reasonably antici-
pated experience."). "Actuarial" is defined as "relating to statistical calculation."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 22 (3d ed. 1971).
42. See Letteer v. Conservancy Dist. No. 30, 385 P.2d 796, 801 (Okla. 1963)
("Subsequent legislation may be considered as an aid in construing prior enact-
ments upon the same subject."). Courts, however, disagree as to the extent to
which subsequent legislation should be relied upon to determine congressional
intent. See Thomas F. Guernsey, The Education For All Handicapped Children Act 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Statutory Interaction
Following the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 68 NEB. L. REv. 564, 585
n.105 (1989) (noting that reliance upon subsequent legislation to determine con-
gressional intent varies greatly among courts).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (Supp. 11 1996).
[Vol. 45: p. 517
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parity.44 In general terms, the Parity Act requires "certain dollar limits" in
health care plans to apply equally to the mentally and physically dis-
abled. 45 Notably, the provisions of the Parity Act apply to health care ben-
efits but not to long-term disability plans.
46
Although the Parity Act requires a plan covering mental and non-
mental health benefits to provide equal "annual and lifetime dollar lim-
its," it does not compel employers to offer mental health benefits in the
first place.4 7 Also, the Parity Act does not apply if its application would
result in a one percent or greater increase in insurance costs. 48 In addi-
tion, the Parity Act is limited to employers who employ more than fifty
employees in a given year.49 For these and other reasons, several com-
mentators have concluded that the Parity Act will have a negligible effect
on discrimination against the disabled in health care plans.50 The weight
44. See Allison C. Blakley, Is Depression Disabling America's Group Insurance
Plans? Mental Health Benefit Parity and the ADA, 27 THE BRIEF 40, 45 (1998) (noting
that Parity Act was enacted as amendment to ERISA and requires limited mental
health parity). "Parity" is defined as "equality of rank, nature, or value." WEa-
STER'S, supra note 41, at 1642. Under the Parity Act, a plan's annual and lifetime
caps on mental health benefits must be equal to those set for nonmental health
benefits included in the same plan. See Blakley, supra, at 45 (noting that under
Parity Act, mental and physical disabilities must be treated equally regarding an-
nual and lifetime caps). If the mental health benefit plan is separate from the
nonmental health benefit plan, however, parity is not required under the Act. See
id. (noting that Parity Act mandates such equality when same benefit plan provides
for both mental and nonmental health benefits).
45. See Brandenburg et al., Recent Developments in Employee Benefits, 34 TORT &
INS. L.J. 319, 330 (Winter 1999) (stating that purpose of Parity Act is "to require
parity in the application of certain dollar limits on mental health benefits with
dollar limits on medical/surgical benefits under the same group health plan").
46. See Powers, Kinder & Keeney, Providing Lesser Benefits for Mental Disabilities
May Violate Federal Law, 12 R.I. EMPLOYMENT L. LETrER 5 (1999) (noting that
Mental Health Benefit Parity Act "applies only to group plans providing health ben-
efits, and it doesn't apply to plans offering other employee benefits-most notably,
disability benefit plans") (emphasis in original); see also Gold, supra note 8, at 787
(noting that Mental Health Benefit Parity Act only applies to health plans provided
by employers).
47. Blakley, supra note 44, at 45.
48. See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (c)(2) (Supp. 11 1996). This section provides:
This section shall not apply with respect to a group health plan (or
health insurance coverage offered in connection with a group health
plan) if the application of this section to such plan (or to such coverage)
results in an increase in the cost under the plan (or for such coverage) of
at least 1 percent.
Id.
49. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1185a(c)(1)(A)-(B) (Supp. 11 1996) (stating that Parity
Act does not apply to small employers and defining "small employer" as "an em-
ployer who employed an average of at least 2 but not more than 50 employees on
business days during the preceding calendar year and who employs at least 2 em-
ployees on the first day of the plan year").
50. See Gold, supra note 8, at 786 (noting that Parity Act allows, and may even
encourage, employers to sidestep its mandate of providing health benefit parity);
Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Insurance and the ADA, 46 DEPAuL L. REV. 915, 928-29
(1997) (noting minimal effect of Parity Act in limiting disparate treatment of
9
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that courts should give the Parity Act in interpreting the ADA is uncertain,
although several courts have labeled it as one indication that Congress did
not intend the ADA to require benefit parity. 51
C. The ADA Dispute Reaches the Courts
It is clear from the plain language of the ADA that discrimination
against an individual on the basis of his or her disability violates the
ADA. 5 2 The issue remains, however, whether the ADA only protects
against discrimination between the disabled and the nondisabled, or
whether it also protects against discrimination between different disabili-
ties. At this point, the answer depends upon which court is addressing the
issue.
53
1. Some Courts Require Actuarial Data or Experience
Some courts conclude that the ADA permits disability-based distinc-
tions in benefit plans only when actuarial evidence, actual experience or
reasonably anticipated experience justifies the distinction. 54 In Schroeder v.
mental disabilities in relation to physical disabilities). For example, Tucker has
noted several ways in which employers can get around the Parity Act. See id. (point-
ing out that (1) Parity Act allows employers to completely exclude mental disabili-
ties from coverage; (2) Parity Act would arguably not apply if employers placed
mental and physical disability benefits in separate plans; and, (3) Parity Act would
allow employer to cover mental disabilities up to percentage of health care costs
that was lower than percentage of health care costs covered for physical
disabilities).
51. See, e.g., Rogers v. Department of Health & Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431,
436 (4th Cir. 1999) (concluding that passage of Parity Act reveals that Congress
did not intend ADA to mandate parity for mental and physical disabilities); Ford v.
Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 610 (3d Cir. 1998) (same), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 850 (1999); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1018 (6th Cir.
1997) (same), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998). For a further discussion of the
Parity Act's role in interpreting whether the ADA prohibits unjustified distinctions
between disabilities, see infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (stating that "[n]o covered entity shall
discriminate against a[n] . . . individual with a disability because of the [individ-
ual's] disability").
53. For a discussion of the different views the courts have taken regarding this
issue, see infra notes 54-83 and accompanying text.
54. For a discussion of the courts that take this view, see infra notes 55-62 and
accompanying text. It should be noted that the actuarial data issue only arises
after the claimant first proves that he or she has standing to bring a claim under
the ADA. See Ford 145 F.3d at 607-08 (addressing whether plaintiff had standing to
bring claim under Title I of ADA before turning to substance of discrimination
claim); see also Nicole Martinson, Inequality Between Disabilities: The Different Treat-
ment of Mental Versus Physical Disabilities in Long-Term Disability Benefit Plans, 50 BAY-
LOR L. REv. 361, 363 (1998) (observing that "[o] ne of the first obstacles presented
to a plaintiff under Title I [of the ADA] is the question of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to the protection of Title I of the ADA (i.e., standing)"). For a discussion
of the requirement that the claimant be a qualified individual with a disability to
have standing under the ADA, see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
526
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Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 55 the plaintiff's benefit plan covered
long-term disability insurance. 56 When the plaintiff was hospitalized for a
heart condition, the defendant insurance company notified him that cov-
erage would discontinue after thirty months because it had determined
that the heart condition resulted from a mental condition. 57 The District
Court for the District of Colorado held that such a distinction between
mental and physical disabilities in insurance plans could only be made if
supported by actuarial principles or reasonably anticipated experience. 58
Similarly, in Baker v. Hartford Life Insurance Co., 59 the plaintiff's father
brought an action against the defendant insurance company, claiming
that the insurance company violated Title III of the ADA when it refused
to provide insurance to the plaintiff.60 Plaintiff asserted that the refusal
was disability based. 61 The District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois held that despite the ADA's safe harbor provision, "[i] t is possible
that the decision to deny plaintiff coverage was not based on considera-
tions of underwriting or classifying risks, in which case plaintiff might be
entitled to recover under the ADA."62 Despite this view, the more popular
55. No. CIV.A.93-M-2433, 1994 WL 909636 (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 1994).
56. See id. at *1 (noting that Schroeder chose long-term disability coverage
and had premium costs withdrawn from his payroll).
57. See id. (noting insurance company's refusal to provide further benefits af-
ter 30 months because after that time its policy did not cover disabilities caused by
emotional or mental conditions). Although the plaintiff claimed that the mental
or emotional condition was secondary to the heart condition, the insurance com-
pany stood by its determination that the heart condition resulted from a mental or
emotional condition. See id. (noting insurance company's refusal to continue pro-
viding benefits despite plaintiffs assertion that heart condition was primary prob-
lem). This case illustrates the difficulty in drawing a line between mental and
physical disabilities; here, both mental and physical disabilities may have been si-
multaneously present. See id. For a further discussion of situations that present
characterization problems, see infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
58. See Schroeder, 1994 WL 909636, at *4. The court stated:
[T]he plan may not.., limit the amount, extent, or kind of coverage
available to an individual, or charge a different rate for the same coverage
solely because of a physical or mental impairment, except where the re-
fusal, limitation, or rate differential is based on sound actuarial principles
or is related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience.
Id.; See Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 432 (D.N.H. 1996)
(holding that although insurers may classify risks under ADA, methods for such
classification must be based on either "sound actuarial principles or related to ac-
tual or reasonably anticipated experience").
59. No. 94 C 4416, 1995 WL 573430 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1995).
60. See id. at *1 (noting defendant insurance company's failure to provide
health insurance to plaintiff).
61. See id. (noting that plaintiff sought "declaratory and injunctive relief...
for defendant's alleged disability-based refusal to provide health insurance to
plaintiff). In one phone call between plaintiff and defendant, the reason given
for the denial of coverage was that the plaintiffs "risk [was] greater than we like to
take on." Id.
62. Id. at *4. The court also noted that basing a denial of coverage on actua-
rial facts does not dispositively prove that the insurer complied with the ADA. See
11
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position is that the ADA does not prohibit disparate treatment between
disabilities because such treatment is not a form of discrimination that
Congress intended the ADA to eliminate.
63
2. Most Courts Hold That The ADA Does Not Protect Against Discrimination
Between Disabilities
All federal circuits that have addressed the issue have held that Title I
of the ADA affords no protection against insurance plans that offer differ-
ent levels of benefits for different disabilities.6 4 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit first took this view in EEOC v. CNA
Insurance Cos.65 In that case, the court held that discrimination, as it was
normally understood, did not occur although the benefits offered to those
with mental disabilities were different from the benefits offered those with
physical disabilities. 66 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that no discrimina-
tion had occurred because all employees, whether nondisabled, mentally
disabled or physically disabled, were offered the same plan-long-term
benefits until age sixty-five if the problem was physical in nature and long-
term benefits for two years if the problem was mental in nature. 67
id. (noting that subterfuge issue remains even when denial of coverage is claimed
to be based on actuarial considerations).
63. See Martinson, supra note 54, at 373-74 (concluding that courts generally
hold that ADA protection only applies to discrimination between disabled and
nondisabled and not to discrimination between individuals with different
disabilities).
64. For a discussion of federal circuit views regarding different levels of bene-
fits for mental and physical disabilities, see infra notes 65-83 and accompanying
text. State courts have also held that distinctions between disabilities are valid
under the ADA. See, e.g., Cramer v. Florida, 885 F. Supp. 1545, 1551 (M.D. Fla.
1995) (holding that ADA did not apply to discrimination between disabilities in
class action suit alleging, in part, that Florida's workers' compensation statute vio-
lated ADA), aff'd, 117 F.3d 1258 (11 th Cir. 1997). Although employees rarely win
suits brought against employers that provide insurance plans offering different
levels of benefits for mental and physical disabilities, some cases settle in favor of
the employee. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 50, at 926 (noting that in Harris v. City of
Phoenix, No. CIV-95-0361 (D. Ariz. May 1, 1996), case settled pursuant to consent
decree in which city agreed to abolish distinction between mental and physical
disabilities in its long-term disability plan).
65. 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996).
66. See id. at 1044 (explaining that although plan "may or may not be an en-
lightened way to do things," it was not discriminatory "in the usual sense of the
term").
67. See id. (noting that plan's terms were same regardless of whether em-
ployee was disabled or not). The plaintiff argued that the plan discriminated
against employees who would become mentally disabled in the future. See id. (not-
ing plaintiffs argument that those employees were now paying towards plan that
would later provide lesser benefits to them than would be provided to employees
who later became physically disabled). The court rejected this argument as a
"dressed up" version of the argument that benefits must be equal for mental and
physical disabilities. See id.
One commentator has dismissed as weak the argument that plans providing
different levels of benefits based on disability are not discriminatory if they are
[Vol. 45: p. 517
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Parker v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,68 followed suit.69 The Sixth Circuit held
that Title I of the ADA does not require the mentally disabled to receive
the same level of benefits as the physically disabled.7 0 Instead, the ADA
"prohibits discrimination between the disabled and the non-disabled." 7 1
Thus, the Sixth Circuit was only concerned with determining whether the
disabled had the "same access to the long-term disability plan" as the
nondisabled. 7
2
Additionally, when the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit addressed the same issue in Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp.,7 3 it used
similar reasoning to dismiss the plaintiffs discrimination claim.74 The
plaintiff's insurance policy in that case also treated mental and physical
disabilities differently. 75 The Third Circuit dismissed the claim that dis-
crimination had occurred in violation of Title I of the ADA.76 The Third
Circuit reasoned that because the same benefit plan had been offered to
the disabled and the nondisabled alike, no discrimination had occurred.
77
equally offered to all employees, regardless of disability. See Rubenstein, supra note
10, at 329-30 (noting that although argument appears valid on its face, its flaws
become apparent when put in context of race or gender hypothetical). Ruben-
stein noted that the Supreme Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976), embraced this argument in a gender context. See Rubenstein, supra note
10, at 329 & n.74 (noting that Court in Gilbert held that exclusion of coverage for
disabilities arising from pregnancy did not discriminate against women because
same plan was offered to both men and women). Congress disagreed with this
holding and "promptly enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to clarify that
anti-discrimination law forbids a health plan from intentionally denying coverage
for services needed by a protected class." Id. at 329-30.
68. 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998).
69. See id. at 1019 (holding ADA is similar to Rehabilitation Act in that it too
only protects against discrimination between disabled in relation to nondisabled).
70. See id. at 1015 (noting that ADA does not require "equality between indi-
viduals with different disabilities").
71. id.
72. Id. One court has dismissed such reasoning as obviously flawed. See Lewis
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1168 (E.D. Va. 1997) (noting that under
logic that permits discrimination between disabilities, employer could refuse em-
ployment to person with mental disability and give job to person with physical
disability, even if mentally disabled individual were more qualified than physically
disabled individual).
73. 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 850 (1999).
74. See id. at 608 (concluding that "[s]o long as every employee is offered the
same plan regardless of ... contemporary or future disability status, then no dis-
crimination has occurred even if the plan offers different coverage for various
disabilities").
75. See id. at 603 (noting plan provided two-year cap on benefits for mental
disabilities, but no such cap for physical disabilities).
76. See id. at 614 (dismissing complaint for failure to state claim).
77. See id. at 608 (noting that as long as disabled and nondisabled employees
were offered same "opportunity to join the same plan with the same schedule of
coverage" then no discrimination had occurred).
13
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Specifically, the Third Circuit noted that the ADA does not mandate cov-
erage parity for the mentally and physically disabled. 78
In Rogers v. Department of Health & Environmental Control,79 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit took the same stance re-
garding distinctions between disabilities under Title II of the ADA.8 0 Ini-
tially, the Fourth Circuit noted that the plain language of the ADA does
not specifically address the issue of whether the Act mandates equal levels
of benefits for the mentally and physically disabled.81 Thus, instead of
relying on the language of the ADA, the Fourth Circuit arrived at its deci-
sion by looking to other sources for support-the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the Rehabilitation Act, the legislative history of the ADA,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") policy, the safe
harbor provision of the ADA and subsequent legislation.8 2 After analyzing
these sources, the Fourth Circuit came to the conclusion that the ADA
does not require equality of benefits for mental and physical disabilities. 83
In Traynor v. Turnage,8 4 the United States Supreme Court addressed a
similar issue under the Rehabilitation Act, which is considered the prede-
cessor of the ADA.8 5 In Traynor, the Court upheld the extension of educa-
78. See id. (noting that "[t]he ADA does not require equal coverage for every
type of disability"). The court determined that it was not possible that Congress
intended the ADA to require coverage parity for all disabilities because such a
requirement "would destabilize the insurance industry." Id.
79. 174 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 1999).
80. See id. at 436 (holding equal benefits between disabilities are not man-
dated under Title II of ADA).
81. See id. at 433 (noting that it is not clear from language of ADA whether
"subjected to discrimination" phrase in 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994) requires same
level of benefits for mentally and physically disabled).
82. See id. at 433-36 (discussing sources of support for holding).
83. See id. at 436 (noting that all sources analyzed lead to conclusion that
benefit parity is not required under ADA).
84. 485 U.S. 535 (1988).
85. See Rubenstein, supra note 10, at 324 (noting that Rehabilitation Act is
predecessor to ADA); Carolee Kvoriak Lezuch, Note, The Americans with Disabilities
Act: Redefining "Major Life Activity" to Protect the Mentally Disabled, 44 WAYNE L. REv.
1839, 1847 (1999) ("The seeds of the ADA originated from the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973.").
Traynor enlarged upon the Supreme Court's holding in Alexander v. Choate,
469 U.S. 287 (1985). See Rogers, 174 F.3d at 434. In Alexander, Tennessee Medicaid
recipients requested an injunction against the Tennessee Medicaid program's de-
cision to reduce the number of days that it would cover inpatient care per year
from 20 to 14. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 289 (noting that Tennessee Medicaid
program decided to reduce number of inpatient days it would cover after finding
projected costs were 42 million dollars over budget). The recipients claimed that
such a reduction violated the Rehabilitation Act because it would have a discrimi-
natory impact on the handicapped. See id. at 289-90. The Supreme Court rejected
this argument and held that the 14-day limitation did not "invoke criteria that have
a particular exclusionary effect on the handicapped."Id. at 302. In addition, the
Court pointed out that the reduction was valid because it imposed the same dura-
tional limit on the handicapped and the nonhandicapped. See id. (stating that
because handicapped and nonhandicapped would be "subject to the same dura-
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tional benefits to disabled veterans who became mentally or physically
disabled without any willful misconduct on their part.8 6 Because Congress
considered alcoholism to be a disability caused by willful misconduct, it
denied the extension to plaintiffs who claimed disability due to alcohol-
ism. 8 7 The Traynor Court determined that the Rehabilitation Act does not
mandate equal benefits for disabilities brought on by willful misconduct
and those not brought on by willful misconduct, and some courts have
reasoned, by analogy, that the ADA does not require equal benefits for
mental and physical disabilities.88
Although several Courts of Appeals have determined that the ADA
does not mandate equality of benefits between disabilities in insurance
plans, advocates for benefit parity suggest that the Supreme Court opinion
in O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.8 9 supports a contrary hold-
ing.90 In O'Connor, an age discrimination case, the plaintiff brought a
claim of violation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 ("ADEA"). 9 1 The Court rejected the defendant's argument that be-
cause someone who was also in the protected class replaced the plaintiff,
there was no case.9 2 The Court held that "[t] he fact that one person in
the protected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is
thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his age."93 Thus, parity
tional limitation" reduction would not "exclude the handicapped from or deny
them the benefits of the 14 days of care the State has chosen to provide").
86. See Traynor, 485 U.S. at 545 (noting that Congress made exception to
usual time limit on educational benefits afforded veterans for veterans who be-
came disabled without any willful misconduct on their part).
87. See id. at 538 (noting that "Veterans' Administration determined that peti-
tioners' alcoholism constituted 'willful misconduct' . .. and accordingly denied the
requested extensions").
88. See, e.g., Lenox v. Healthwise of Ky., Ltd., 149 F.3d 453, 457 (6th Cir. 1998)
(noting that Traynor supports conclusion that ADA does not prohibit disparate
treatment between disabilities); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608-
09 (3d Cir. 1998) (same); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1019
(6th Cir. 1997) (same). Another Supreme Court Rehabilitation Act case that has
been cited as support for the conclusion that the ADA does not require equal
treatment of benefits is Alexander. See Lenox, 149 F.3d at 457 (citing Alexander as
support for determination that ADA does not prohibit distinctions between disabil-
ities); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1997) (same).
89. 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
90. See Martinson, supra note 54, at 376 (noting that claimants continue to
"forge forward" despite courtroom setbacks, arguing that O'Connor supports their
argument that discrimination between disabilities is not permissible).
91. See O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 309 (noting that petitioner O'Connor brought
suit under ADEA, alleging he was fired because of his age).
92. See id. at 312 (noting that it is equally discriminatory to replace 40-year-old
with 39-year-old as it is to replace 56-year-old with 40-year-old, even though both
56-year-old and 40-year-old are members of protected class).
93. Id. The Supreme Court, in a recent ADA case, came to a similar conclu-
sion, noting that Title II of the ADA applies to distinctions between disabilities. See
Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 591 n.10 (1999) (concluding that "as a matter
of precedent and logic" term "discrimination" encompasses "disparate treatment
among members of the same protected class"). Significantly, although the dissent
2000] NOTE
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advocates argue that prohibited discrimination occurs when insurance
plans treat mental disabilities differently from physical disabilities because
the mentally disabled have "lost out" because of their disability.94 The
Fourth Circuit in Lewis v. Kmart Corp. rejected this argument and held that
Kmart's long-term disability benefit plan was valid under the ADA even
though Kmart did not produce evidence supporting the need for a distinc-
tion between mental and physical disabilities.
95
III. FACTS OF LWIS V KMART CoRP.
According to the facts set forth in Lewis, the plaintiff, Harold Lewis,
began working for Kmart Corporation in 1984. 96 Lewis worked at various
Kmart stores for eleven years until the severe depression he had been cop-
ing with since 1979 forced him to take a leave of absence on March 13,
1995.9 7 Lewis had elected to participate in a long-term disability plan of-
fered by Kmart that capped benefits for mental disabilities at two years,
but capped benefits for physical disabilities upon a participant turning age
sixty-five. 98 Because the insurance company classified Lewis' condition as
mental in nature, the benefits he had been receiving under the plan
ceased after the two-year period was up.99
Lewis filed suit, alleging that Kmart had violated Title I, Section
102(a) of the ADA by offering an insurance plan that discriminated on the
concluded that discrimination under Title II of the ADA did not include disparate
treatment among members of the same protected class, it did not reach this con-
clusion for Title I of the ADA. See id. at 2197-98 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The
majority's definition of discrimination . . . substantially imports the definition of
Title I [of the ADA] into Title II [of the ADA] by necessarily assuming that it is
sufficient to focus exclusively on members of one particular group."). Thus, the
dissent appears to support the proposition that Title I of the ADA protects against
disparate treatment between disabilities, even though it does not believe the same
is true for Title II of the ADA. See id at 2198 (noting that definition of discrimina-
tion under Title I of ADA includes circumstance when "some members of a pro-
tected group are treated differently from other members of that same group").
94. See Martinson, supra note 54, at 377 (noting argument that because
O'Connor stands for proposition that it is discrimination when someone in pro-
tected class loses out to another person in protected class, treating mentally dis-
abled persons differently from physically disabled persons is discrimination, and
thus violates ADA, which "prohibits discrimination against individuals because of
the individual's disability").
95. For a further discussion of the Lewis court's holding, see infra notes 104-38
and accompanying text.
96. See Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 168 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that
Kmart hired Lewis to train to be manager in 1984).
97. See id. (noting that Lewis worked at several Kmart stores over course of 11
years and took leave of absence from management position at Virginia Kmart store
on March 13, 1995).
98. See id. (stating that Kmart began offering optional long-term disability
plan in 1976 and Lewis had decided to participate in plan).
99. See id. (noting that insurance company ceased benefits after two years be-
cause it classified Lewis' condition as mental in nature).
[Vol. 45: p. 517
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss3/4
2000] NOTE
basis of disability.10 0 The district court denied Kmart's summary judg-
ment motion and subsequently conducted a bench trial, entering judg-
ment in favor of Lewis. 10 1 Kmart filed a timely appeal of the district
court's ruling, and the Fourth Circuit heard the case. 10 2 The Fourth Cir-
cuit vacated the district court's entry of judgment in favor of Lewis and
concluded that Title I of the ADA does not require employers to offer the
same level of long-term disability benefits for the mentally and physically
disabled.10
3
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING IN
LEws v. KM4RT Cozy.
A. Narrative Analysis
In vacating the district court's holding that Kmart violated Title I of
the ADA by providing an insurance plan that treated mental and physical
disabilities disparately, the Fourth Circuit in Lewis relied heavily on its pre-
vious decision in Rogers.10 4 In Rogers, the Fourth Circuit held that Title II
of the ADA does not require long-term disability plans sponsored by pub-
lic entities to provide the same level of benefits for mental and physical
disabilities. 10 5 Because the Lewis court determined that there was no ma-
terial difference between Title I, Section 102(a) and Title II, Section 202
of the ADA, it reached its holding by tracking the analysis of the Rogers
court.106
100. See id. (noting that Lewis filed suit, alleging that "Kmart violated his
rights under Title I, § 102(a) of the ADA to be free from discrimination on ac-
count of his disability in the terms and conditions of his employment").
101. See id. (summarizing prior history of case). The district court declared
that the two-year cap on mental disability benefits violated Title I, § 102(a) of the
ADA and ordered Kmart to continue providing Lewis with disability benefits until
he turned 65, so long as he continued to be disabled. See id.
102. See id. at 169 (noting Kmart's timely appeal).
103. See id. at 172 (holding that Title I, § 102(a) of ADA does not require
insurance plan to provide same level of long-term disability benefits for mental
and physical disabilities).
104. See id. at 170 (noting that reasoning applied in Rogers also applies to
Lewis).
105. See Rogers v. Department of Health & Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431, 436
(4th Cir. 1999) (concluding that "ADA does not require South Carolina to provide
the same level of benefits for mental and physical disabilities in its long-term disa-
bility plan for state employees").
106. See Lewis, 180 F.3d at 170 (stating that nature of employing entity is only
difference between Title I, § 102(a) and Title II, § 202 of ADA). The Fourth Cir-
cuit considered it unlikely that Congress intended to treat public and private em-
ploying entities differently regarding discrimination liability under the ADA. See
id. ("Certainly Congress did not intend for an employer's liability for illegal dis-
crimination under the ADA to turn on the private versus public nature of the em-
ploying entity.").
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1. The Lewis Court Applies the Rogers Court's Reasoning by Analogy
The issue in Rogers was whether the "subjected to discrimination"
phrase in Title II, Section 202 of the ADA requires equal benefits for
mental and physical disabilities. 10 7 The court noted that the plain lan-
guage of the ADA does not answer the question.10 8 Thus, the Fourth Cir-
cuit looked to other sources for guidance on the issue. 10 9
The first of these sources, relied upon by the Fourth Circuit in Rogers,
and thus Lewis, was the Supreme Court's interpretation of Rehabilitation
Act cases.' 10 The Fourth Circuit determined that it was appropriate to
compare the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act because of the similarity be-
tween the two Acts and because the Rehabilitation Act is arguably the pre-
cursor to the ADA."' The Fourth Circuit in Rogers relied upon two
Supreme Court Rehabilitation Act cases to support its holding. 112 The
first was Alexander v. Choate.1" 3 In Alexander, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that a fourteen-day limitation on a Medicaid program's inpatient
care, reduced from twenty-one days, was valid under the Rehabilitation
107. See Rogers, 174 F.3d at 433 (noting that issue is whether insurance plan
"'subjected [Rogers] to discrimination' on the basis of his disability").
108. See id. (noting that plain language of ADA fails to answer whether "sub-
jected to discrimination" phrase in Title II mandates benefit parity for mentally
and physically disabled).
109. See id. (noting that although plain language does not help answer ques-
tion, there is other material that can be turned to for guidance).
110. See Lewis, 180 F.3d at 170 (noting that Rogers court found support for its
holding in Supreme Court Rehabilitation Act cases).
111. See Rogers, 174 F.3d at 433 ("The Rehabilitation Act is the most appropri-
ate starting point for our discussion because, in many ways, it is the precursor to
the ADA."). The Fourth Circuit went on to note that the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA share similar language. See id. One such similarity is the definition of
disability. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (B) (1994) ("[T]he term 'individual with a
disability' means . . . any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has
a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impair-
ment."), with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) ("The term 'disability' means, with re-
spect to an individual-(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.").
Additionally, the Acts use similar language to refer to their nondiscrimination
mandate. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994) ("No otherwise qualified individual
with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity . .. conducted by any Executive agency .... ), with 42
U.S.C. § 12132 (1994) ("[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason
of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion by any such entity.").
112. See Rogers, 174 F.3d at 434 (looking to "[rlelevant Rehabilitation Act
precedent").
113. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
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Act.11 4 It rejected the argument that the reduction discriminated against
the handicapped, reasoning that the same level of coverage was provided
to the handicapped and the non-handicapped.
115
The second case the Fourth Circuit looked to for support was Traynor
v. Turnage.116 In Traynor, the Court upheld the extension of educational
benefits to disabled veterans who became physically or mentally disabled
without any willful misconduct on their part.1 17 Willful misconduct was
presumed to cause alcoholism. 1" 8 Plaintiffs, who suffered from alcohol-
ism, claimed this was a violation of the Rehabilitation Act because it dis-
criminated against them on the basis of their disability. 1" 9 The Supreme
Court rejected this argument and held that the Rehabilitation Act does
not require that equal benefits be granted to all categories of
disabilities.12
0
After analyzing Alexander and Traynor, the Fourth Circuit determined
that Congress must have been aware of the Supreme Court holdings in
these cases when it drafted the ADA language. 1 2 1 The Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA contain comparable anti-discrimination language. 122 Thus,
the Fourth Circuit reasoned, Congress must not have intended the ADA to
require parity of benefits when it knew the Supreme Court had inter-
preted the Rehabilitation Act as not requiring such parity.' 23
In addition to the Supreme Court cases interpreting the Rehabilita-
tion Act, the Fourth Circuit found support for its holding in Rogers, and
thus Lewis, in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Gui-
114. See id. at 309 (holding that reduction does not violate § 504 of Rehabilita-
tion Act).
115. See id. (noting equal accessibility of coverage for handicapped and non-
handicapped and pointing out that "the State is not required to assure the handi-
capped 'adequate health care' by providing them with more coverage than the
nonhandicapped").
116. See Rogers, 174 F.3d at 434 (using Traynoras support for its holding that
ADA does not prohibit discrimination between disabilities).
117. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 545 (1987) (noting that Congress
lifted time limit for using GI Bill educational benefits for veterans who became
disabled without any willful misconduct on their part).
118. See id. (noting that Veterans' Administration considered primary alcohol-
ism to result from willful misconduct).
119. See id. at 542 (noting petitioners claimed that regulation violated Reha-
bilitation Act because it discriminated against handicapped individuals).
120. See id. at 549 ("There is nothing in the Rehabilitation Act that requires
that any benefit extended to one category of handicapped persons also be ex-
tended to all other categories of handicapped persons.").
121. See Rogers v. Department of Health & Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431, 434
(4th Cir. 1999) (presuming that Congress knew of Supreme Court's interpretation
of § 504 of Rehabilitation Act when it enacted ADA).
122. See id. (noting that ADA contains "antidiscrimination language in
§ 12132 that parallels § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act").
123. See id. (noting that Supreme Court interpreted Rehabilitation Act not to
require benefit programs "to provide precisely the same benefits to all classes of
disabled persons").
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dance ("EEOC Guidance ') on the ADA's application to health insur-
ance. 1 24 The EEOC has the responsibility of enforcing and interpreting
the ADA. 125 The EEOC Guidance explained that providing lower levels of
health insurance benefits to the mentally disabled as compared to the
physically disabled does not violate the ADA.' 2 6 Although the EEOC Gui-
dance only addressed the role of the ADA in health insurance benefits, the
Fourth Circuit applied the EEOC's construction in the EEOC Guidance by
analogy to long-term disability benefits.127
The Fourth Circuit also pointed to the ADA's "safe harbor" provision
to support its conclusion that the ADA does not require equal levels of
benefits for the mentally and physically disabled. 128 The Fourth Circuit
determined that this provision embodies Congress' intent that the ADA
not force insurance companies to change the way they do business.
129
The court also pointed to the legislative history behind this provision to
confirm that it was Congress' intent that the ADA not restrict insurance
companies in their classification of risks.
1 30
Finally, the Fourth Circuit noted that legislation subsequent to the
enactment of the ADA supported its holding that the ADA does not re-
quire benefit parity for the mentally and physically disabled.' 3 ' Specifi-
124. See id. at 435 (noting that EEOC Guidance supports construing ADA as
not requiring health insurance benefit parity).
125. See Lezuch, supra note 85, at 1841 (noting that responsibility of EEOC is
to enforce and interpret ADA).
126. See EEOC: Interim Enforcement Guidance on Application of ADA to Health In-
surance, [Fair Employment Practices Manual] LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 405:7115, at
7117-18 (June 8, 1993) [hereinafter EEOC Guidance]. The EEOC said:
Typically, a lower level of benefits is provided for the treatment of
mental/nervous conditions than is provided for the treatment of physical
conditions .... Such broad distinctions, which apply to the treatment of
a multitude of dissimilar conditions and which constrain individuals both
with and without disabilities, are not distinctions based on disability.
Consequently, although such distinctions may have a greater impact on
certain individuals with disabilities, they do not intentionally discriminate
on the basis of disability and do not violate the ADA.
Id. (footnotes omitted)
127. See Firak, supra note 27, at 271 (pointing out that EEOC Guidance only
applies to health insurance, not disability insurance); Giliberti, supra note 26, at
603 (same).
128. See Rogers, 174 F.3d at 435 (noting that insurance generally funds disabil-
ity benefits and safe harbor provision applies to restrict ADA's leverage in eliciting
changes in business practices of insurance companies).
129. See id. (noting that safe harbor provision provides proof of Congress'
intent not to alter insurance companies' methods of doing business).
130. See id. (noting legislative history of safe harbor provision). For example,
a House Report explained that the ADA should not affect "the way the insurance
industry does business in accordance with the State laws and regulations under
which it is regulated." H.R. REP. No. 101485(11), at 136 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 419.
131. See Rogers, 174 F.3d at 436 ("Congressional activity since the passage of
the ADA indicates that Congress does not read the ADA to require parity of cover-
age for mental and physical disabilities.").
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cally, the court noted that the 1996 Parity Act and its legislative history
establish that Congress did not intend the ADA to require parity of bene-
fits for mental and physical disabilities.13 2 In addition, the Fourth Circuit
pointed out that the Parity Act does not regulate disability benefits, but
only addresses parity for health insurance benefits. 133 From all of these
sources, the Lewis court, by adopting the reasoning of the Rogers court,
came to the conclusion that Title I of the ADA does not require parity of
benefits for mental and physical disabilities. 1
34
2. The Fourth Circuit Rejects the O'Connor Argument
The Fourth Circuit also rejected Lewis' argument that the Supreme
Court's opinion in O'Connor supported his proposition that it is discrimi-
nation under the ADA for an employer to offer a different level of benefits
for mental and physical disabilities.1 3 5 Lewis asserted that he had been
discriminated against because he had "lost out" because of his disability,
just as the plaintiffs in O'Connor had "lost out" because of their age. 13 6
The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, noting the lack of Supreme
Court precedent supporting the view that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act
require different disabilities be treated equal. 13 7 In short, the Fourth Cir-
cuit concluded that Lewis' reliance on O'Connor did not "make intuitive
sense."
138
B. Critical Analysis of Lewis v. Kmart Corp.
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Lewis is consistent with the conclu-
sion reached by all other federal circuits addressing the issue.' 3 9 The
132. See id. (noting that Senator Domenici, co-sponsor for Parity Act, stated
that Act was "a compromise to begin down the path of parity and nondiscrimina-
tion for the mentally ill people in this country who have health insurance" (quot-
ing 142 CONG. REc. S9917 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1996) (emphasis added))).
133. See id. (declaring it is significant that Parity Act does not apply to disabil-
ity insurance).
134. See Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 170 (1999) (adopting reasoning
of Rogers court); Rogers, 174 F.3d at 436 (noting that one conclusion can be drawn
from all sources considered in relation to issue, and that conclusion is that ADA
does not require parity of long-term disability benefits for mentally and physically
disabled).
135. See Lewis, 180 F.3d at 171 (noting that Lewis argued that O'Connor sup-
ported proposition that ADA prohibits employers from providing lesser level of
benefits to one type of disability as compared to another type of disability).
136. Id.
137. See id. (noting that Supreme Court precedent, such as Traynor, reveals
that Supreme Court does not interpret ADA as prohibiting preferential treatment
between disabilities). The Fourth Circuit further noted that Traynor is indistin-
guishable from Lewis. See id. (comparing provisions in Rehabilitation Act and ADA
and concluding there is no "meaningful way to distinguish" Traynor from Lewis).
138. Id. at 171-72.
139. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608 (3d Cir. 1998)
(holding that discrimination between mental and physical disabilities is not pro-
hibited under Title I of ADA), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 850 (1999); Parker v. Metro-
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Fourth Circuit's sources of support for its holding, however, contain vari-
ous flaws. First, the Fourth Circuit applied the holdings of Rehabilitation
Act cases by analogy to the ADA case before it. 140 There are reasons, how-
ever, that the provisions of the ADA should not be compared to those of
the Rehabilitation Act. 141 The ADA was enacted because the then current
laws were "inadequate to address the pervasive problems of discrimination
that people with disabilities [were] facing."' 42 This could be interpreted
to mean that the Rehabilitation Act was inadequate legislation because it
was enacted prior to the ADA. 14 3 In addition, as applied to Lewis, the ADA
is distinguishable from the Rehabilitation Act because it explicitly ad-
dresses insurance coverage, while the Rehabilitation Act does not contain
language discussing the insurance industry.144
Even assuming that the Rehabilitation Act is sufficiently analogous to
the ADA to justify looking to Rehabilitation Act cases for support, Alexan-
der is a weak source of authority for the Fourth Circuit's holding in
Lewis.1 4 5 In Alexander, the Court was careful to point out that the limita-
tion on hospital stays was facially neutral and did not have a particular
exclusionary effect on the handicapped. 14 6 In Lewis, however, the insur-
ance plan discriminated between disabilities on its face.' 4 7 In addition,
Alexander may even support Lewis' argument because Kmart's insurance
plan arguably has a particular discriminatory effect on the mentally dis-
abled, as they are the only group whose long-term disability benefits are
politan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1019 (6th Cir. 1997) (same), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 871 (1998); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 1996) (same).
140. See Lewis, 180 F.3d at 170 (noting that Rehabilitation Act cases decided
by Supreme Court are informative in determining whether ADA prohibits distinc-
tions between disabilities).
141. See Stephanie Proctor Miller, Keeping the Promise: The ADA and Employment
Discrimination on the Basis of Psychiatric Disability, 85 CAL. L. REV. 701, 701 (1997)
(stating that in many contexts, Rehabilitation Act cases are inappropriate basis for
interpreting ADA).
142. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 18 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 47
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 329.
143. See Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1167 n.8 (E.D. Va.
1997) (construing Rehabilitation Act as one of laws that did not adequately rem-
edy problem of disability discrimination, leading to enactment of ADA); see also
Miller, supra note 141, at 704 (noting that cases decided under Rehabilitation Act
are infused with biases against mentally disabled persons).
144. See Gold, supra note 8, at 801 (noting that ADA surpasses scope of Reha-
bilitation Act by explicitly addressing insurance industry and plainly prohibiting
use of subterfuge to evade purposes of ADA).
145. For a discussion of the facts of Alexander, see supra notes 114-15 and ac-
companying text.
146. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 302 (1985) ("The new limitation
does not invoke criteria that have a particular exclusionary effect on the handi-
capped; the reduction, neutral on its face, does not distinguish between those
whose coverage will be reduced and those whose coverage will not ....").
147. See Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 168 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that
Kmart's long-term disability benefit plan capped mental disability benefits at two
years and physical disability benefits upon turning age 65).
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limited. 14 8 The Alexander Court explicitly stated that a finding of discrimi-
nation depends on the way the benefit is defined.1 49 There is a strong
argument that the limitation in Lewis is disability-based under Alexander
because the benefit is defined in specific terms of mental disability bene-
fits, when it should be defined in general terms of adequate disability
benefits.
1 5 0
The Fourth Circuit's reliance on Traynor as essentially indistinguish-
able from Lewis is also flawed. 15  The Traynor court made it clear that the
denial of benefits to veterans suffering from alcoholism did not violate
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because willful misconduct caused
the disability.152 In Lewis, however, Kmart's long-term disability benefit
plan discriminated against the mentally disabled, which is not a class that
became disabled due to willful misconduct.' 5 3 Finally, if Traynor and Alex-
ander are read to support the proposition that the ADA does not protect
148. Cf Giliberti, supra note 26, at 602-03 (noting that EEOC Guidance,
which allows for unequal treatment in health care between mentally and physically
disabled, conflicts with Alexander because "the Guidance permits a 'particular ex-
clusionary effect' on those with mental disabilities"). There is a difference be-
tween a denial or a limitation based on number of days in a hospital and a denial
or a limitation based on the characterization of a disability as mental. See id. at 603
(distinguishing broad disability-based characterization, as in Lewis' insurance plan,
from limit on type of treatment, such as length of hospital stay).
149. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 301 ("The benefit... cannot be defined in a
way that effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped individuals the mean-
ingful access to which they are entitled .... ").
150. Cf H. Miriam Farber, Note, Subterfuge: Do Coverage Limitations and Exclu-
sions in Employer-Provided Health Care Plans Violate the Americans with Disabilities Act?,
69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 850, 904-06 (1994) (criticizing EEOC for permitting limitations
on mental health care when presumably EEOC would not permit such limitations
on cancer health care). Specifically, Farber notes that it is inconsistent to define
mental health care as the relevant benefit in mental disability cases when the rele-
vant benefit in cancer cases is defined as comprehensive health care. See id. at 906
("Because a mental/nervous condition limitationjust like a cancer treatment limi-
tation, is a limitation defined in terms of health, not time or place, the two limita-
tions should be treated in the same manner."). If the relevant benefit relating to
mental disabilities were comprehensive health care, providing lesser levels for mental
disabilities than for physical disabilities would be a disability-based distinction. See
id. at 905-06 (noting that EEOC would presumably consider limitation in cancer
coverage as disability based because it defines "the relevant benefit as 'comprehen-
sive health care' rather than 'cancer care"') (emphasis added).
151. See Lewis, 180 F.3d at 171 (determining that "there is no meaningful way
to distinguish Traynor from this case").
152. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 549-50 (1988) ("Those veterans are
not, in the words of § 504, denied benefits 'solely by reason of [their] handicap,'
but because they engaged with some degree of willfulness in the conduct that
caused them to become disabled.").
153. See id. at 545 (pointing out that Veterans' Administration considers will-
ful misconduct to include primary alcoholism, which is alcoholism not caused by
acquired psychiatric disorder).
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against discrimination between disabilities, this will result in a large
number of valid disability discrimination claims being dismissed. 154
In addition, the Fourth Circuit rejected as untenable Lewis' argument
that O'Connor supported his position that providing lower levels of benefits
for mental disabilities violated the ADA. 155 The Fourth Circuit rejected
the argument on the premise that the ADA does not provide protection
against disparate treatment between disabilities, whereas the ADEA pro-
tects against disparate treatment between members of the protected
class. 156 The Supreme Court, however, does not agree with this position
and has determined that the O'Connor holding can be applied analogously
to ADA cases.'
57
The Fourth Circuit also pointed to the EEOC Guidance, which de-
clares that it is not a disability-based distinction to offer a lower level of
health care benefits for the treatment of mental conditions than for physi-
cal conditions. 1 58 The EEOC reasoned that distinctions between mental
and physical disabilities were permitted because: "(1) mental conditions
affect persons with and without disabilities, and (2) mental disorders in-
clude dissimilar conditions." 15 9 As one commentator pointed out, how-
ever, this reasoning could be applied to physical disorders that are covered
by the ADA. 16 0 In addition, the EEOC Guidance does not apply to long-
term disability benefits. 1 6 1 Actions brought by the EEOC support the in-
ference that the EEOC did not intend the reasoning in its Guidance to
154. See Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 58-59
(4th Cir. 1995) (noting requirement that benefited individual be outside pro-
tected class "would lead to the dismissal of many legitimate disability discrimina-
tion claims" because of enormous number of people who fall within ADA's broad
scope of protection).
155. See Lewis, 180 F.3d at 171 (concluding that O'Connor "is of no help to
Lewis").
156. See id. at 171-72 (concluding that although ADEA protects individuals in
protected class against discrimination in relation to anyone, even other members
of protected class, ADA was not "designed to ensure that persons with one type of
disability are treated the same as persons with another type of disability").
157. See Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 591 n.10 (1999) (citing O'Connor
as support for determination that discrimination under ADA includes disparate
treatment among those who belong to same protected class).
158. See EEOC Guidance, supra note 126, at 7117-18 (noting that distinctions
between mental and physical disabilities in health insurance plans are not based
on disability and thus do not violate ADA).
159. Giliberti, supra note 26, at 602.
160. See id. (noting that "cancers comprise a multitude of dissimilar condi-
tions, and someone with skin cancer probably is not a person with a disability,
whereas a person with leukemia may be covered under the ADA"). Immu-
nodeficiency disorders also include the characteristics that the EEOC has used to
distinguish mental disorders. See id. (noting that under EEOC's logic, insurers
could limit or refuse coverage for immunodeficiency disorders because they in-
clude dissimilar conditions such as AIDS and allergies, and people with and with-
out disabilities suffer from such disorders).
161. See Firak, supra note 27, at 271 (noting that EEOC Guidance does not
apply to disability insurance); Giliberti, supra note 26, at 603 (same).
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apply to long-term disability benefits. 162 For example, in EEOC v. CNA
Insurance Cos., the EEOC sought to compel an employer to pay long-term
mental disability benefits to a former employee until the EEOC had the
opportunity to ascertain whether the employee had a valid claim under
the ADA.' 6 3 Although the case was dismissed before the EEOC had the
chance to determine the validity of the claim, the EEOC presumably
would not have sought to enjoin the employer if the EEOC Guidance ap-
plied to long-term disability benefits. 1
64
In addition, the Fourth Circuit looked to the "safe harbor" provision
of the ADA to support its conclusion that Kmart could offer an insurance
plan that did not provide the same level of benefits for the mentally and
physically disabled. 1 65 The Fourth Circuit, however, failed to address the
final sentence of the safe harbor provision, which states that the provision
cannot be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADA.16 6 In
addition, the Fourth Circuit did not address the legislative history that sup-
ports the view that Congress intended such distinctions only be made
when actuarial data or previous experience justifies the distinction. 1 67 Be-
cause Kmart provided no evidence that the distinction in its plan was
made with classification principles in mind, the court erred in holding
that the distinction was permissible under the ADA.
168
162. See EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1996) (bringing
action for employee because employer's long-term disability benefit plan provided
different levels of benefits for mental and physical disabilities); EEOC v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, No. 97 Civ. 6620(WK), 1998 WL 851605 *1, *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(arguing that long-term disability benefit plan violates ADA because plan treats
mental and physical disabilities disparately); EEOC v. Avamark Corp., Civ. No. 97-
734 (RMV) (D.D.C. 1997), noted in Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158,
1168 (E.D. Va. 1997) (same). In addition, the EEOC noted that a reason for the
distinction between mental and physical disabilities in health care benefits is that
mental disorders affect people with and without disabilities. See EEOC Guidance,
supra note 126, at 7117 (grouping mental conditions under category of conditions
that "constrain individuals both with and without disabilities"). In cases involving
long-term disability benefits, however, such reasoning is inapplicable because all
persons receiving such benefits are disabled. See Giliberti, supra note 26, at 603
(noting that all recipients of long-term disability insurance are disabled, so part of
EEOC's logic behind distinguishing between mental and physical disorders would
not apply in these cases).
163. See CNA, 96 F.3d at 1041 (noting that EEOC brought action on behalf of
woman suffering from long-term mental disability).
164. See id. at 1045 (dismissing plaintiffs claim).
165. See Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 170 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that
ADA's safe harbor provision is source of guidance on issue).
166. For a discussion of the different interpretations of the word subterfuge,
see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
167. For a discussion of the legislative history supporting the requirement for
actuarial data or experience to justify distinctions between mental and physical
disabilities, see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
168. See Blakley, supra note 44, at 45 (noting that weight of authority says bur-
den of proof falls on insurer to provide sound actuarial justification for disparate
treatment of mental and physical disabilities). Before the issue of burden of proof
is ever reached, however, the claimant must convince the court that he or she has
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Finally, the Fourth Circuit pointed to Congress' enactment of the Par-
ity Act, which was passed subsequent to the enactment of the ADA, as evi-
dence that Congress did not intend the ADA to require benefit parity. 169
Although subsequent legislation may be used to interpret congressional
intent, the credence that should be lent to such legislation is debatable. 170
In addition, even if subsequent legislation were regularly given substantial
weight, in this case the subsequent legislation is arguably inapplicable. 171
Whereas the Parity Act requires "automatic parity" between mental and
physical disabilities in health insurance, the ADA does not require "par-
ity," but simply requires a justifiable basis for distinctions between mental
and physical disabilities. 172
standing to bring the claim. See Martinson, supra note 54, at 363 (noting that
standing is one of first issues claimant must address when seeking protection
under Title I of ADA).
One commentator has suggested that actuarial data is relevant when justifying
disparities between mental and physical health insurance benefits, but that there is
no justification for treating mental and physical long-term disability benefits dispa-
rately. See Firak, supra note 27, at 270 (suggesting that because long-term disability
benefits are paid as proportion of employees' prior wages and amount of benefits
bears no relation to type of disability, "insurers cannot justify limits for persons
with mental disabilities based on the cost of the benefit").
169. See Lewis, 180 F.3d at 170 (noting that "post-ADA congressional activity"
is source of guidance in determining congressional intent behind ADA). The ar-
gument is that because Congress enacted the Parity Act after the ADA's enactment,
then Congress must not have intended the ADA to require parity of benefits. See
Blakley, supra note 44, at 46 ("[T]he limited mental health benefit parity now re-
quired under federal law for group health plans is the best evidence that nothing
in Titles I or III of the ADA requires parity in the benefit treatment of mental and
physical disorders."). In terms of long-term disability benefits, the argument is that
Congress could not have required parity for such benefits because it did not in-
clude long-term disability benefits in the Parity Act. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1018 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[Ilt appears that Congress did not
believe the necessity for parity between mental and physical disabilities in long-
term disability plans was sufficiently compelling to include them ... [in the Parity
Act]."), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998).
170. For a discussion of the use of subsequent legislation to determine con-
gressional intent, see supra note 42 and accompanying text. Reliance on legislative
silence in subsequent legislation may be an even more questionable practice. See
Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 (1969) (stating that "legislative silence is a poor
beacon to follow in" statutory interpretation); cf Symons v. Chrysler Corp. Loan
Guarantee Bd., 670 F.2d 238, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Drawing inferences as to con-
gressional intent from silence in legislative history is always a precarious
business.").
171. See Appellee's Brief at 57, Iewis., 180 F.3d 166 (No. 98-2179) (noting that
Parity Act serves different purpose than ADA).
172. See id. (observing that ADA "seeks to ensure that disability-based dispari-
ties in any type of insurance coverage are justified by ... factual basis rather than
mere bias" while Parity Act "seeks to impose a form of automatic parity in health
insurance benefit levels for mental and physical health treatment costs").
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V. IMPACT OF THE LEWIS HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit in Lewis has added to the case law that concludes
that the ADA allows unjustified distinctions to be drawn between mental
and physical disabilities. 73 This holding is unsettling for several rea-
sons.1 7 4 First, as a group that has been historically subjected to discrimina-
tion, the mentally disabled need the ADA's protection.1 75 In fact,
Congress recognized the prevalence of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities, mental and physical alike, when it enacted the ADA. 1 7 6
One excuse that has been used in an attempt to justify lesser benefits for
the mentally disabled is that mental disabilities are not as easily substanti-
ated as physical disabilities. 177 As science progresses and the biological
bases for mental disabilities continue to be discovered, however, this ex-
cuse for disparate treatment between the mentally and physically disabled
becomes unacceptable. 178
In addition, permitting distinctions to be drawn between mental and
physical disabilities will likely lead to increased litigation to determine
whether a particular disability or illness is more properly characterized as
"physical" or "mental." Several cases will unfortunately be ambiguous. 179
173. For a discussion of other courts that held the same way, see supra notes
64-83 and accompanying text.
174. For a discussion of the reasons the Lewis holding is unsettling, see infra
notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
175. For a discussion of the historical mistreatment of the mentally disabled,
see supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
176. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994), (outlining congressional findings re-
garding discrimination against disabled individuals).
177. See Christopher C. Taintor, Comment, Federal Agency Nonacquiescence: De-
fining and Enforcing Constitutional Limitations on Bad Faith Agency Adjudication, 38
ME. L. REv. 185, 195 (1986) (noting that mental disabilities are "less susceptible to
objective evaluation and more difficult to substantiate than purely physical
problems").
178. See Brian D. Shannon, The Brain Gets Sick, Too: The Case for Equal Insur-
ance Coverage for Serious Mental Illness, 24 ST. MARY's LJ. 365, 366 (1993) (noting
that medical research shows that organic diseases of brain are cause of major
mental illnesses). If a mental illness is determined to have a biological basis, one
commentator has suggested that a claimant might argue that a distinction between
that illness and physical illnesses is arbitrary, and thus violates the ADA. See Chris-
topher Aaron Jones, Legislative "Subterfuge"?: Failing to Insure Persons with Mental
Illness Under the Mental Health Parity Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 50
VAND. L. REv. 753, 780-81 (1997) (noting that individual with proven biological
mental illness could claim that mental/physical distinction in his or her case "is
evidence of a lack of sound principles or of stereotypical notions and has no cost-
effectiveness basis when compared to treatment for illnesses such as heart
disease").
179. See generally Youndy C. Cook, Comment, Messing with Our Minds: The
Mental Illness Limitation in Health Insurance, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 345 (1996) (noting
instances when it is difficult to label disorder as either physical or mental). For
example, depression often accompanies terminal illnesses such as cancer. See id. at
353 (noting that several terminal illnesses are frequently accompanied by cancer);
see also Saah v. Contel Corp., 780 F. Supp. 311, 313, 316 (D. Md. 1991) (determin-
ing that insurance company was not unreasonable when it applied limitation on
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This ambiguity can be blamed to some extent on the fact that different
courts use different reasoning to classify a disability as physical or mental,
and the outcome of a case may depend entirely on the reasoning a court
chooses to apply.' 80
Mental health advocates continue to press forward in their fight, de-
spite setbacks such as the holding in Lewis. The current trend is against
psychiatric coverage to plaintiff who needed behavior modification and group
therapy following car accident that caused injury to plaintiff's brain), affd, 978
F.2d 1256 (4th Cir. 1992); Simons v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 536 N.Y.S.2d 431,
434-35 (App. Div. 1989) (holding that although plaintiff was malnourished due to
anorexia nervosa, which is psychiatric condition, cause of disorder is not relevant
and plaintiff was entitled to insurance benefits for hospitalization).
180. See Cook, supra note 179, at 348-49 (noting that courts either use symp-
tom/manifestation approach, treatment approach or causation approach to make
mental/physical distinction).
The different results that may arise under different approaches can be illus-
trated by looking at Tolson v. Avondale, 141 F.3d 604 (5th Cir. 1998). In Tolson,
plaintiff's depression was allegedly caused by hepatitis and resulting drug treat-
ment. See id. at 605-06 (noting that plaintiff argued that he should be covered
because mental condition was result of either Hepatitis C or Interferon treat-
ment). The court held that the insurer could properly exclude the depression
from coverage. See id. at 610-11 (holding that mental disorder is still mental disor-
der regardless of its cause or effect and thus insurance company interpreted lan-
guage of plan correctly). In Tolson, the court did not concern itself with the fact
that the depression may have been caused by a physical illness. See id. at 609 (not-
ing that court held in previous case that "depression is a 'mental disorder,' irre-
spective of its physical causes or symptoms").
This result, however, was not obvious from the facts of the case because, pre-
sumably, if the Tolson court had taken the causation approach, it would have held
differently. See Cook, supra note 179, at 349 (noting that courts that adopt causa-
tion approach "interpret the term 'mental illness' to mean those illnesses or disor-
ders that have a purely functional or psychological cause"). Under the causation
approach, if a physical disorder causes a mental disorder, the disorder is consid-
ered "physical." See id. (stating that physical illnesses under this approach include
any illness with physical origin). In Tolson, if the court applied the causation ap-
proach and found that the depression had been caused by either the hepatitis or
the treatment for the hepatitis, the court probably would have classified the disor-
der as physical. See Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 696 F. Supp. 1342, 1347
(C.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that autism does not come under category of mental
illness because it has "identifiable organic basis"), aff'd, 898 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir.
1990), amended and superseded by 910 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1990); Prince v. United
States Life Ins. Co., 257 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892-93 (App. Div. 1965) (holding that in-
sured, who suffered mental illness after loss of eye, was covered under insurance
plan that excluded coverage for mental diseases because reasonable person would
assume he or she was "covered for all disorders or reactions ... directly resulting
from an accidental bodily injury"), affd, 17 N.Y.2d 742 (1966). In a case, however,
where a mental disorder could have a physical cause, but it is not entirely certain
whether the physical problem caused the mental disorder, the court may refuse to
group the disorder under the "physical" category because of the lack of proof. See
Killebrew v. Abbott Lab., 352 So. 2d 332, 334-35 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (finding that
medical experts' failure to uncover organic brain damage supported conclusion
that functional disorder caused plaintiff's mental problems even though medical
experts did not deny that encephalitis may have played some role in manifestation
of mental problems), affd, 359 So. 2d 1275 (La. 1978).
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equal treatment.1 8 One commentator noted that if the courts continue
to conclude that the ADA allows for disparate treatment of the mentally
disabled in insurance plans, mental health advocates will increase their
efforts in the legislative arena.1 8 2 And the legislative arena is where some
believe the decision ultimately belongs.'
8 3
Donna M. Orzell
181. For an overview of the courts that have taken the predominant view that
mental and physical disabilities need not be treated equally, see supra note 64-83
and accompanying text.
182. See Employment Law Alert (visited Oct. 22, 1999) <http://
frontpage.nhdd.aa.psiweb.com/emplaw/apr98/elarta.htm#pagetop> (noting that
if courts "continue to declare they will not remedy the disparity in standard [long-
term disability] policy coverage, between mental and physical disabilities," mental
health advocates "will redouble their efforts to mandate such a policy change at
the congressional level").
183. See, e.g., Blakley, supra note 44, at 47 (stating that "[w]hether full mental
health parity should be mandated in health and disability insurance plans is a
choice best left to the legislative arena"); Martinson, supra note 54, at 380 (noting
that some courts believe that because ADA does not expressly say whether discrimi-
nation between disabilities is prohibited, if Congress intended ADA to prohibit
discrimination between disabilities, "it is for Congress to make those changes, not
the courts").
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